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Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 TGai FILS Authentication Protocol and State Machine Date: Authors: Name Robert Sun; Submission Affiliations Address Suite 400, 303 Terry Fox Huawei Technologies Drive, Kanata, Ontario Co., Ltd. K2K 3J1 Slide 1 Phone email +1-613-2871948 [email protected] Rob Sun etc, Huawei.

Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Abstract This submission is aiming at providing in depth analysis of the FILS authentication scheme and FILS state machine in respective and also providing the technical ground for proposed texts in 11-12-1282r0 Submission Slide 2 Huawei. Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Conformance w/ TGai PAR & 5C Conformance Question Response Does the proposal degrade the security offered by Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) already defined in 802.11? No Does the proposal change the MAC SAP interface?

No Does the proposal require or introduce a change to the 802.1 architecture? No Does the proposal introduce a change in the channel access mechanism? No Does the proposal introduce a change in the PHY? No Which of the following link set-up phases is addressed by the proposal? (1) AP Discovery (2) Network Discovery (3) Link (re-)establishment / exchange of security related messages (4) Higher layer aspects, e.g. IP address assignment 3 Submission Slide 3 Huawei. Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 FILS Authentication Design The desirable FILS authentication design should

consider: Reusable: possibly most of the existing AKM protocols, cipher suites Less impact: on 802.1x and EAP state machine; no need to drastically re-design the WiFi security system. Cost effective: easier to implement and no tangible IPR liability. How to design the FILS authentication scheme System level design: How can a system architecture help to make FILS authentication/FILS easier? Other relevant performance hog components: ie, DHCP/DNS, remote TTP server. How can we make them fly for FILS? Re-authentication vs Initial Authentication: How to make reauthentication design to be compatible with Initial Authentication Submission Slide 4 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Whats the main contributors of the Delay Authentication and 4 way handshake are taking too long (in range of 100ms to 1000ms) 12/041r1 contribution has the detailed performance analysis of 802.11EAP authentication. https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/documents?is_dcn=41&is_group=00ai Authentication at some occasions also involves backend systems which adds

significantly to the overall delay in BSS. Certification reading and verification Authentication Key initialization and generation. EAP interlock state machine Chatty EAP-TLS handshake IP layer functions taking too long 802.1x state machine blocks the DHCP and Other IP layer functions till the STA is authenticated. Submission Can we do the piggy-back way (i.e piggy-back DHCP over other messages) ? Slide 5 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 FILS System Design Secured Network Network A: -TTP authentication/Authorization -802.1X/EAP based RSNA architecture WiFi Host

Secured Network Network B: -Wall Gardened Architecture for FILS client - Routed FILS connectivity within Wall Gardened zone -802.1x (EAP is optional, ie. PSK) based RSNA architecture - Similar to Guest 802.1x port in implementation. WiFi Host FILS Link AP Authentication Server Ref: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/solutions/Enterpris e/Network_Virtualization/AccContr.pdf Submission Authentication Server AP Slide 6 DHCP Server Wall Gardened Network Huawei

Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 For Network A Existing IEEE 802.11 components 802.1X PAE (including state machine and Management Entities, MIB) EAP (EAP-TLS, RFC 5216 and RFC 3748) (Only as reference model) 4-way handshake Note: IEEE 802.11ad is reliant on 4-way handshake to delivery information?? Mandates strong WPA/WPA2 security requirements Submission Mutual authentication with 4 way handshake (RSNA) Link Setup time requirements can not degrade the security property. Slide 7 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 IEEE 802.11 TGai FILS Authentication

AP / Authenticator Supplicant AS 1) 802.11 Beacon EAPOL-Start Triggers the 802.1X PAE EAPOL-Start TLV carries the NID information (i.e Certificate) 2) 802.11 Probe Request State 1 State 1 3) 802.11 Probe Response 4) |802.1x EAP OL-Start with Security Parameters for FILS handshake) Remove EAP-ID req/response Access Request (EAP Request) State 5 EAPOL-EAP ( EAP Authentication Protocol Exchange) EAPOL-EAP ( EAP Authentication Protocol Exchange) State 5 Accept/ EAP Success/ PMK AS Generates

PMK RFC 3748 states: EAP-ID Request/Response not necessarily the first message, in section 2 5) msg 1: EAPOL-KEY (Anounce, Unicast)) Supplicant Generates PMK Authenticator Stores PMK And Generate Anounce Supplicant Derives PTK Submission Slide 8 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 IEEE 802.11 TGai FILS Handshake (Revising 802.11Revmb Section 4.10.3.2) Supplicant AP /

Authenticator Supplicant with PTK State 5 6) Msg 2: EAPOL-Key (Snounce, Unicastm MIC) Authenticator with PTK |GTK|IGTK State 5 7) Msg 3: EAPOL-Key (Install PTK, unicast, MIC, Encrypt (GTK, IGTK) )) 8) Msg 4: EAPOL-Key (Unicast, MIC) State 4 Install PTK, GTK IGTK Install PTK, GTK IGTK State 4 Secure Data Communication Submission Slide 9 Huawei Nov 2012

doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Protocol Analysis Pros: Keep IEEE 802.11 RSNA architecture (Authentication then Data Communication) Omit the IEEE 802.11 open authentication handshake and association handshake. (FILS association is done when the FILS authentication is completed) Keep the 4 way handshake intact (No need to evaluate the security property) Generally applicable to TTP based authentication and IBSS based authentication. No piggyback datagram on Frames (Piggyback datagram on frame is violating the IEEE 802.1x design principles) No impact on relevant Standards and implementations Cons: Submission No improvements on EAP-(TLS) multiple rounds of handshake given fragmentation could take place EAP based authentication with Remote AAA server still takes significant time IP layer functions (DHCP and DNS) is still taking its toll in making FILS authentication slow Slide 10 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1

For Network B Enable the Wall gardened FILS solution Enable Virtual Port on IEEE 802.1X PAE on both supplicant and Submission Authenticator to guide the FILS specific authentication scheme into a Wall Garden /VLAN. Note: Section 12.1 of IEEE 802.1X Rev-d4. AP (authenticator) can choose most flexible authentication scheme (PSK, or no authentication) to provide minimum effort in authentication. STA and AP can still utilize the 4 way handshake to generate keying materials (PTK, GTK|IGTK) to protect the OTA communication. The DHCP / DNS could be arranged locally (on AP or collocating with AP) Or using Frame-IP-Address (Radius Attribute 8) to allocate IP address to device during the authentication process FILS traffic are contained within the zone (with Firewall or other means) which regulates the traffic which is beyond the scope of IEEE 802.11TGai Slide 11 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1

What is Virtual Port As defined in IEEE 802.1X rev d4 A MAC Service or Internal Sublayer service access point (D.4) that is created on demand. Virtual ports can be used to provide separate secure connectivity associations over the same LAN. How to create and delete the Virtual ports on Authenticators PAE is based on section 12.7 of IEEE 802.1X. Within the virtual port, the FILS station can maintain different security association than regular association. Submission Slide 12 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 IEEE 802.11 TGai FILS Authentication with 4 way handshake AP / Authenticator Supplicant AS 1) 802.11 Beacon 2) 802.11 Probe Request State 1 State 1 3) 802.11 Probe Response VLAN ABC

4) |802.1x EAP OL-Start with FILS FILS authentication Scheme (TBD) AP create the Virtual Port on Receipt of EAPOL-Start State 5 Authentication Scheme (TBD) EAPOL-EAP ( EAP Authentication Protocol Exchange) AS Generates PMK State 5 5) msg 1: EAPOL-KEY (Anounce, Unicast)) Supplicant Generates PMK Authenticator Stores PMK And Generate Anounce If enable the Frame-IP-address on EAP request, then DHCP Can be omitted Supplicant Derives PTK Submission

Slide 13 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 IEEE 802.11 TGai FILS Handshake (Option 1: With 4 Way handshake)) Supplicant AP / Authenticator VLAN ABC Supplicant with PTK State 5 6) Msg 2: EAPOL-Key (Snounce, Unicastm MIC) Authenticator with PTK |GTK|IGTK State 5 7) Msg 3: EAPOL-Key (Install PTK, unicast, MIC, Encrypt (GTK, IGTK) )) 8) Msg 4: EAPOL-Key (Unicast, MIC) State 4 Install PTK, GTK IGTK

Install PTK, GTK IGTK State 4 Secure Data Communication Submission Slide 14 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Protocol Analysis Utilizing the Virtual Port to contain the FILS traffic and regulate on the basis of backend security system design. Enable separate FILS security association which can separate the FILS state from regular Association Inheriting the 4 way handshake to make sure the OTA communication is secured Local Authentication (At the proximity of the AP) which should be faster Timer or Event triggers the FILS device to do the Full authentication/Full association. Submission Slide 15 Huawei

Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Implication of FILS Authentication State Machine Submission Slide 16 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Modified 802.11 FILS Authentication and Association State Machine State 1 Unauthenticated, Unassociated Class 1 Frames Successful 802.11 Authentication Deauthentication FILS Deauthentication (Timer or Event) Successful FILS Authentication State 2 Authenticated,

Unassociated Class 1 & 2 Frames Unsuccessful (Re)Association (Non-AP STA) Successful 802.11 Authentication Successful (Re)Association RSNA Required Deassociation FILS Authenticated Class Class 1, 1, 22 &3 &3 Frames Frames State 3 Authenticated, Associated (Pending RSN Authentication) State 5 Deauthentication IEEE 802.1x controlled Port unblocked unblocked

Class 1 ,2 & 3 Frames IEEE 802.1X Controlled Port Blocked FILS Key Confirmed 4- way Handshake Successful Unsuccessful (Re)Association (Non-AP STA) Disassociation Successful 802.11 Authentication Successful (Re) Association No RSNA required or Fast BSS Transitions Submission State 4 Deauthentication Authenticated, Associated Class 1 ,2 & 3 Frames IEEE 802.1X Controlled Port UnBlockedSlide 17 Slide 17 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1

References IEEE 802.1X Rev D4-5 Submission Slide 18 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 The Security Model of RSNA AS STA Policy Decision Point 1. Authenticate to derive MSK Policy Decision Point 2: Derive PMK from MSK AP Policy Enforcement Point Policy

Enforcement Point 3: Use PMK to enforce 802.11 channel access Derive and use PTK Reference: IEEE 802.11i Overview, 2002, Nancy Cam-Winget, et al Submission Slide 19 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 802.1X-REV/D4.5 Submission Slide 20 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Stroll Poll Straw-Poll-1: Do you support the proposal of the FILS Authentication Procedure as described in Slide 13 and 14 of this contribution?

Result Submission Yes No Abstain_______________ Slide 21 Huawei Nov 2012 doc.: IEEE 802.11-12/1281r1 Questions & Comments Submission Slide 22 Huawei.

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