Chapter 5Groups and MoralityPSYCHOLOGICALAj ustice, are more compatible with an objective senseof the concept, given their basis in principles orshared practices.Perhaps because social psychology defines moralthought, feeling, and behavior as that which individuals subjectively consider right or wrong, the focushas been on individuals in general (for reviews, seeHaidt & Kesebir, 2010; Monin & Jordan, 2009;Pagliaro, 2012). Thus, the morality of particularindividuals has been relatively neglected by socialpsychologists. The first section discusses the roots ofthe individual approach to morality in social psychology. It also reviews distinct approaches to moralpersonality and honor, which focus on individuals’particular moral self-views.Although moral personality may appear to havelittle to do with groups, individual ideas aboutmorality rely on some reference to what a moral person is like (for general discussions, see Harré,1993). And, whatever their particularities, individuals are moral or immoral in their families, in theirneighborhoods, in their workplaces, and in theircountries. Thus, even individual morality operateswithin groups. For these reasons, and others thatwill be discussed, understanding groups and morality is essential to understanding morality in general.Thus, the second section, reviews four of the centralways in which groups are important to morality. Thethird section reviews the ways in which perceivedmorality is important to examinations of stereotypesand prejudice toward out-groups. The fourth sectionUNCORRECTEDPROOFS AMERICANAcross social and personality Psychology, there isrenewed interest in morality. Consistent with thesefields’ general emphasis on subjective psychologicalprocesses, recent work tends to view any thought,feeling, or behavior that includes a notion of rightand wrong as moral (for a review, see Haidt & Kesebir,2010). This makes moral psychology an unusuallydiverse topic. Therefore, this chapter reviews a wideswath of relevant work, on topics ranging from personality, self-perception, and self-esteem; tosocial cooperation, trust, and interdependence; tostereotypes, prejudice, and group identity.Although social and personality psychologistsexamine individuals’ use of specific notions of rightand wrong—based on such concepts as justice,trustworthiness, warmth, cooperation, and harm—they tend to avoid the question of whether individuals’ subjective notions of right and wrong areactually moral in an objective sense (Blasi, 1990). Inthis respect, psychology diverges sharply from aphilosophical or ethical approach, which typicallycompares individuals’ subjective notions of moralityto a conception of morality that is defined objectively by principle or shared practice (Blasi, 1990;for discussions in philosophy, see MacIntyre, 1984;Rawls, 1971). Given that morality is not definedobjectively in social and personality Psychology, wemust attend closely to which notions of right andwrong researchers consider to be in the moraldomain. As explained in the following section, somenotions of morality, such as trustworthiness andSSOCIATIONColin Wayne Leach, Rezarta Bilali, and Stefano PagliaroWe thank Atilla Cidam for helpful comments on a previous version of this chapter. Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology: Vol. 2. Group Processes, M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (Editors-in-Chief)Copyright 2015 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.BK-APA-HPS-V2-131231-Chp05.indd 12312307/11/13 3:51 PM

Leach, Bilali, and PagliaroCORRECTEDPROOFS AMERIn many philosophical approaches, an individual’smorality is judged by how close it comes to what arational, moral person with all necessary information would do (for a discussion, see MacIntyre,1984). For example, in Rawls’s (1971) influentialapproach, individuals in a society should agree tojudge questions of justice from an impartial “originalposition,” in which they are not influenced by whothey are as individuals or by their particular situation (e.g., wealthy or poor, male or female,from one ethnic group or another). Thus, jurors in amurder trial should weigh the evidence and judgethe defendant’s guilt without relying on their personal values and goals and without reference to theirlife history or life circumstances. Jurors shouldassume that they, their fellow jurors, and the defendant are equal and thus that the principles of justiceapply equally to all involved. This view is built onclassic philosophical notions of good moral judgment, most notably David Hume’s judicious spectator, Adam Smith’s impartial spectator, and ImmanuelKant’s categorical imperative (D’Agostino, 2008).NNSSALAICGLOOCHYICANPhilosophical and DevelopmentalApproachesPSIn social Psychology, morality tends to be examinedas an individual phenomenon. It is individuals whothink, feel, and behave in ways that they considermoral. And it is individuals who sometimes disagreeabout what counts as moral. Thus, groups are givenlittle place in morality. This individualist approachto morality in social psychology is likely an inheritance of prior philosophical and developmentalapproaches, which tended to focus on the moral“everyman.”OCIATHE INDIVIDUAL APPROACHTO MORALITYUThe Kohlberg developmental tradition may alsohave encouraged an individualist view of morality insocial psychology. In the Kohlberg tradition, childrenare seen as making moral judgments according tothe “social conventions” of their parents, their peers,and their society only at the earliest and leastadvanced stage of their moral development (for amore general discussion of social development, seeChapter 7, this volume). Thus, true, or advanced,moral judgment is made with reference to “universal” principles of justice, rather than individual,group, or community standards (for discussions, seeBlasi, 1990; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Indeed, as inthe philosophical view, the Kohlberg tradition portrays moral individuals as using moral principlesimpartially, without concern for their individual values and goals, their relationships, their groupmemberships, or the situation at hand (for a discussion, see Miller, 2006).As with many other conceptions of human cognition as a generic process, the analysis of themoral everyman examines the generic individual ina generic circumstance. As such, the individualistapproach to morality in social psychology examinesno person and no place in particular. This leaves thegroup (as well as the social context more generally)out of morality. Ironically, the individualistapproach to morality in social psychology is “anindividualism without individuals” (Leach, 2002).By focusing on individuals in general, the individualist approach tends to ignore the ways in whichparticular individuals differ from one another morally.The next section discusses the work on moral personality and on individual honor and virtue that hasbeen done by personality psychologists and by thosesocial psychologists who are interested in individualdifferences.TIOreviews theory and research on morality regardingin-groups. As will be seen, morality is at the heart ofin-group identity, positive group esteem, and socialaction. As a result of its importance to views of ingroup and out-group, it should not be surprisingthat morality plays a central role in the quality ofrelations between groups. This issue is reviewed inthe fifth section.Moral PersonalityFor most of its history, personality psychology hasexamined the degree to which individuals see themselves (and others) as possessing particular traits.The most prominent approach today views personality traits in terms of the five-factor model, whichincludes openness and intellect, conscientiousness,extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism andemotional stability. Personality psychologists have124BK-APA-HPS-V2-131231-Chp05.indd 12407/11/13 3:51 PM

Groups and MoralityNJust, brave, and caring individuals, however, arebelieved to have different personality traits. Forexample, the brave are seen as most agentic and thecaring as most agreeable. In contrast, the just areseen as most “moral” and as most honest, principled, and fair (for a broader discussion of justice, seeChapter 4, this volume).TIOHonor and Moral VirtuePSYCHOLOGICALASSOCIAIn many cultural traditions, being trustworthy andotherwise moral is one important way in which individuals maintain a sense of honor or virtue(Dahlsgaard et al., 2005; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002b). Although honor currently may operate more explicitly in cultures ofthe Mediterranean (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a), honor is central to thewestern philosophical tradition (see MacIntyre,1984). This is likely why the ancient Greek emphasis on moral virtue as a cornerstone of honorappears to be equally strong in people from moreand less honor-oriented cultures in the 21st century.Cultural values and norms may dictate how important sexuality, family reputation, and personalachievement are to honor, but the moral virtue oftrustworthiness is a more constant concern( Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2002a). As a result,even cultural groups that do not emphasize honorexpress the view that trustworthiness is important totheir self-image. For example, Rodriguez Mosqueraet al. (2002a) asked participants in more (i.e., Spain)or less (i.e., the Netherlands) honor-oriented societieshow bad they would feel if they were thought to bedishonest and untrustworthy. Across culturalgroups, individuals expected to feel very bad aboutbeing immoral in these ways. Other studies havefound that believing oneself to be more generally“immoral” or a “bad person” is linked to lower selfesteem (for reviews, see Crocker & Wolfe, 2001;Tafarodi & Swann, 2001).Across these different approaches to individualmorality, it is evident that researchers (and participants in their studies) have a broad definition ofwhat is moral. It also is clear, however, that sometraits are more generally and more strongly considered moral. Trustworthiness and justice are thetraits that are seen as most moral and are also theUNCORRECTEDPROOFS AMERICANlong viewed communal traits (e.g., agreeableness—sympathetic, kind, cooperative, sincere; conscientiousness—dutiful, reliable) as distinctfrom agentic traits (e.g., extraversion, openness andintellect; for reviews, see Paulhus & John, 1998;Wiggins, 1991; see also Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972).Many studies in the United States show that individuals believe they are more communal than theirpeers, friends, and family members believe them tobe (for a review, see Paulhus & John, 1998). It isunclear, however, whether the agreeableness andconscientiousness factors, or the more general communion dimension they constitute, should beconsidered moral.Partly because the five-factor model of personality does not include an explicitly moral factor, several lines of work identify morality as an importantadditional aspect of personality (cf. Aquino & Reed,2002). For instance, Ashton and Lee (2008) havefound consistent evidence for an honesty–humilityfactor in more than a dozen languages, includingnon-Indo-European languages, such as Filipino,Korean, and Turkish. Individuals who see themselves as less honest–humble report more unethicalbusiness practices, greater materialism, greater willingness to engage in sexual harassment, a strongerdesire for dominance, and more criminality. Thus,seeing oneself as a less moral person is associatedwith seeing oneself as acting in ways that are lessmoral.In a different approach, Park, Peterson, andSeligman (2006) recruited more than 100,000 English-speaking Internet users from 54 countries.These participants were asked to indicate how muchthey possessed each of 240 personality traitsdesigned to assess the “character virtues” of justice,humanity, temperance, wisdom, transcendence, andcourage. Fairness, kindness, and honesty were thetraits that participants across countries mostascribed to themselves. These traits are the onesmost commonly identified as moral across many different cultural and religious traditions around theworld (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005).Similarly, Walker and colleagues conducted severalstudies with large, diverse samples and found that“the moral person” is imagined to be particularlyjust, brave, or caring (e.g., Walker & Hennig, 2004).125BK-APA-HPS-V2-131231-Chp05.indd 12507/11/13 3:51 PM

Leach, Bilali, and PagliaroLASSOCIATIONParticipants, however, tended to see themselves asonly somewhat more intelligent than others. In alater study, Van Lange and Sedikides (1998) foundthat Dutch students self-aggrandized their honesty more than their intelligence (compared withthe average student). Importantly, Van Lange andSedikides examined the reasons for participants’greater moral self-aggrandizement. They found thathonesty was seen as a more desirable characteristicto possess, as more under one’s personal control,and as less verifiable than intelligence. Only thegreater desirability of being honest explained whyparticipants self-aggrandized with respect to thatcharacteristic. Because being honest is more personally and socially desirable than being smart, participants made a stronger claim of being more honestthan their peers (see also Paulhus & John, 1998).In another line of research, Epley and Dunning(2000) found that university students in the UnitedStates saw themselves as “holier than thou.” That is,they tended to overestimate how much they woulddonate to charity, cooperate with a peer, or help apeer compared with their actual behavior in thestudies. Epley and Dunning found that this sense ofindividual morality was achieved mainly by overestimating one’s own morality, rather than underestimating others’ morality. Balcetis, Dunning, andMiller (2008) used a similar approach with elementary and university students from individualist(western Europe, United States) and collectivist(Spain, China) societies. They found individualiststo overe